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In a much-quoted article written during 
the height of the U.S. war in Vietnam, 
Harvard professor Samuel Huntington 
made the following observations: 
The most dramatic and far-reaching 
impact of the war in South Viet Nam has 
been the tremendous shift in population 
)?om the countryside to the cities. In the 
early 1960s it was still accurate to speak of 
South Viet Nam as 80 to 85 percent rural. 
Today no one knowsfor certain the size of 
theurban population, but it is undoubtedly 
more than double and perhaps triple what 
it was a few years ago. 
He went on to note that "The 
principle reason for this massive influx 
of population into the urban areas is, of 
course, the intensification of the war 
following the commitment of American 
combat troops in 1965." Deducing the 
implications of this for wars against rural 
revolutionary forces, Huntington 
suggested the need to qualify Sir Robert 
Thompson's claim that People's 
Revolutionary War is immune to the 
direct application of military force. "If 
the 'direct application of mechanical and 
conventional power' takes place on such 
a massive scale as to produce a massive 
immigration from countryside to city," 
Huntington argued, "the basic 
assumptions underlying the Maoist 
doctrine of revolutionary war no longer 
operate. The Maoist-inspired rural 
revolution is undercut by the American- 
sponsored urban revolution." 
Buoyed by the fact that the National 
Liberation Front's 1968 Tet Offensive 
had not galvanized support for the 
revolution among Vietnamese urban 
dwellers, Huntington went on to 
summarize the implications of 
urbanization for the future of Vietnam: 
Dr,]irn Glassman isassociatedwith thecommunity 
Faculty of Metropolitan State University, St. 
Paul, Minesota, USA. 
[Hlistory - drastically and brutally 
speeded up by theAmerican impact -may 
pass the Viet Cong by. Societies are 
susceptible to revolution only at particular 
stages in their development. A t  the 
moment the rates of urbanization and 
modernization in the secure rural areas 
exceed the rate of increase in Viet Cong 
strength. At  a time when the South 
~ietnamese Army is beginning to show 
signs of being able to operate on its own, 
The Viet Cong are becoming increasingly 
dependent on North Vietnam for 
manpoweras wellassupp1ies.A movement 
which oncehad the potential for developing 
into a truly comprehensive revolutionary 
forcewithanappeal to both ruraland urban 
groups could now degenerate into the 
protest of a declining rural minority 
increasingly dependent upon outside 
support. 
Inanabsent-mindedway the Unitedstates 
in Viet Nam may well havestumbled upon 
theanswer to 'wars of national liberation.' 
The effective response lies neither in the 
questfor conventional military victory nor 
in the esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of 
counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead 
forced-draft urbanization and 
modernization which rapidly brings the 
country in question out of the phase in 
whicha rural revolutionary movement can 
hopetogeneratesufficientstrength tocome 
to power. ' 
Huntington's remarks were rightly 
reviled by many critics who found his 
callousness to Vietnamese suffering and 
social dislocation appalling. But I want 
to suggest that his argument is quite 
important - both because it correctly 
identifies the demographic shiis which 
have undermined rural revolutionary 
movements in the past few decades and 
because it exemplifies the conscious 
appropriation of "forced-draft 
urbanization and modernization" as 
weapons in the arsenal of imperial 
warfare. 
I want to go further than this, 
however, and point out that contrary to 
what Huntington coyly suggests, 
counter-insurgency "gimmicks" have 
themselves become part of the arsenal 
that helps produce urbanization. And I 
will show that ecological destruction is 
one substantive means by which US. 
planners have furthered their counter- 
insurgency goals. Thus, ecological 
destruction has become integrated into 
counter-insurgency as a method of 
producing the refugees necessary for 
effective control of the countryside by 
imperial powers and their local allies. 
The process, as I will show, is not one that 
either began or ended with the US. wars 
in Southeast Asia; but it is precisely 
because of this that Huntington's 
perspective is instructive, for counter- 
insurgency, rather than being seen as an 
esoteric bag of gimmicks, should be seen 
as a conscious application of force to the 
project of furthering the Eurocentric 
project of modernization. And in this 
sense, I will argue, the ecological 
destruction and social dislocation 
caused by counter-insurgency is 
contiguous with the much larger 
patterns of ecological destruction and 
social dislocation caused by the rise of 
capitalism from the sixteenth century 
onwards. 
One of the most spectacular forms of 
environmental destruction visited on 
Vietnam by the U.S. military was the use 
of herbicides as part of the defoliation 
campaign. Use of defoliants was nothing 
new: the U.S. had used napalm 
extensively in Korea, for example." In 
Vietnam, however, the use of new and 
experimental chemical defoliants was 
intensified. During August 1961, in the 
context of the counter-insurgency war 
and the project for rural "Pacification," 
the U.S. began using herbicides on an 
experimental basis. Both forests and 
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food crops were targeted, with the 
purpose being to deny the rural 
population cover and subsistence so that 
they could be forced either to urban 
centers or to the concentration camps 
euphemistically dubbed "strategic 
hamlets." As the official U.S. Air Force 
history puts it in describing the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) position at the end of 
1967, "[alfter crops had died in target 
areas, groups of civilians had moved to 
areas under government control, further 
aggravating the guerrilla's manpower 
problems."J Furthermore, as the JCS' 
counter-insurgency head observed in 
December 1967, " [allthough the policy 
to create refugees for military purposes 
does not, in so many words, appear in 
any MACV [Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam] document, the 
necessity is openly recognized as a 
realistic requirement ...."' 
The herbicide program, Operation 
Ranch Hand, operated with the catchy 
motto "Only We Can Prevent Forests," 
and it did much to live up to this motto: 
between the beginning of 1962 and the 
beginning of 1970, the U.S. dropped one 
hundred million pounds of herbicides 
on over four million acres of South 
Vietnam.5 The combined effects of 
napalm, white phosphorous and Agent 
Orange (comprised of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T) 
were environmentally devastating and 
led to the coining of the term "ecocide." 
Between one-fourth and one-half of 
Vietnam suffered defoliation at some 
point during the war. As much as 41 
percent of South Vietnam's mangrove 
forests were denuded. Other scorched 
earth tactics included direct attacks on 
animals and the use of giant bulldozers, 
"Rome Ploughs," to clear forests. 
The environmental destruction 
caused by this policy of "drying up the 
sea to catch the fish is a legacy with 
which Vietnam continues to live. 
One expert in agricultural 
economics who had lived in Vietnam for 
many years told me that the flooding of 
rice lands continues to be a major 
problem in Vietnam because so many 
hillsides are denuded of foliage that 
rainfall is not absorbed adequately and 
rushes down onto the plains.7 A report 
on Vietnam issued by the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature 
says of the environmental situation that 
"much of the damage can probably 
never be repaired."8 
The success of U S  warfare in 
swelling urban centers with refugees 
also had social costs: a whole generation 
of Vietnamese youth grew up without 
learning farming skills or developing 
other abilities that were essential to 
traditional Vietnamese society. 
Meanwhile a culture of prostitution, 
drug addiction, racketeering and petty 
commerce blossomed, leaving 
revolutionary Vietnam a social 
reconstruction project every bit as 
daunting as its task of environmental 
restoration? But the dislocatioits were 
not seen by US. planners as a reason to 
reconsider either strategy or tactics; 
rather, the dislocation of the rural 
population become a central ingredient 
in fighting counter-insurgency wars. 
The herbicide program was by no 
means the only (or even the major) 
component of this approach. In fact, 
RAND corporation studies conducted 
during the 1960s suggested abolishing 
the herbicide program in Vietnam, 
arguing that it was often 
counterproductive because it alienated 
peasants from the South Vietnamese 
government and the US. military. The 
US. military rejected these arguments 
and continued using herbicides until the 
Nixon administration finally ended the 
program because it left insufficient 
supplies for US. domestic users.1° But 
whatever the actual impact of herbicides 
on peasant attitudes and behavior, 
"forced-draft urbanization and 
modernization" was also produced 
simply by massive bombing, which left 
enormous environmental damage in its 
own right." In Cambodia, to cite another 
case for purposes of comparison, 
bombing by itself led to much of the 
urbanization that occurred during the 
early to mid-1970s, when Phnom Penh's 
population grew from about half a 
million to over two milli~n?~ 
In Vietnam, the effects of bombing 
cannot be disentangled from all the other 
tactics used to create new demographic 
realities, so the three million refugees 
created by the end of 1967 and the ten 
million created by 1973 cannot be seen 
narrowly as the result of one or another 
form of warfare.13 But the proportional 
responsibility does not matter. What 
matters is that all tactics were either 
explicitly or implicitly environmentally 
destructive, all either explicitly or 
implicitly aimed to create refugees from 
rural areas and all were consciously 
adopted precisely because they either 
actually did or were thought to 
successfully undermine rural support 
for revolution. 
The success of environmentally 
destructive counter-insurgency tactics in 
creating refugees - if not necessarily in 
creating allies in the counter-insurgency 
struggle - helps account for its 
continuing role in US. warfare. US. 
policies in Central America during the 
1980s have often been compared to 
earlier policies in Southeast Asia and 
justifiably so.14 In El Salvador, for 
example, the US.-backed regime used 
napalm and other defoliants extensively 
throughout the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  leading to the 
destruction of large amounts of forest. 
Fragmentation and incendiary bombs 
also caused severe environmental 
damage. According to a Salvadoran 
priest, "these bombs leave craters fifteen 
feet deep and sever trees too thick to 
encircle with one's arms." In some 
regions, bombing created a food crisis, 
causing shortages of corn, beans and 
rice.15 
The destruction of Salvadoran forest 
as counter-insurgency policy exac- 
erbated the already severe deforestation 
that has occurred over the years as a 
consequence of US. and Salvadoran 
"development" policies, which have 
emphasized export crops like cotton and 
coffee.16 Over 95 percent of El Salvadois 
original tropical deciduous forests are 
gone and only 7 percent of the country 
has forest cover today." Meanwhile, loss 
of foliage on hillsides has led to severe 
erosion, which affects more than 77 
percent of the country. Topsoil loss 
reaches rates of 20 percent ann~ally?~ 
The war between indigenous 
guerrillas and the US.-backed Sal- 
vadoran government produced a tidal 
wave of refugees along with (and 
because of) this environmental 
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destruction, but most of these refugees 
have not gone to San Salvador. Rather, 
they have migrated within the country 
or left entirely: displaced persons within 
the country have been estimated at 
200,000 to 500,000; as many as 750,000 
Salvadorans fled to the United States, 
with another 250,000 fleeing to Mexico 
and 50,000 to 100,000 going elsewhere in 
Central America.19 This means that up to 
a fifth or more of the Salvadoran 
population has been displaced by war 
and environmental destruction, a higher 
proportion than the Vietnamese 
displaced at the height of the Vietnam 
war.20 Counter-insurgency has not 
contributed as much to urbanization and 
modernization in El Salvador as it did in 
Vietnam; but it has helped "dry up the 
sea" in which the Salvadoran rural 
insurgency hoped to swim, thus denying 
the rebels the possibility of a military 
victory. 
In Guatemala, to cite one more case, 
in an effort to quell the country's 
insurgency, US.-backed armed forces 
destroyed forests, fields and livestock, 
displacing one million Guatemalans. 
Fire is used to destroy the environment 
and displace people. Most of the refugees 
are of Mayan Indian ancestry and the 
army intentionally targets their corn 
cropsfor destruction because, along with 
destroying a vital food source, this 
practice undermines the Indians' 
psychological resistance by breaking an 
age-old and symbolically loaded bond 
- based on the production and 
reproduction of life - between their 
communities and the earth. Crop 
destruction also leads to serious erosion 
problems and renders agricultural land 
~seless.2~ 
The army relocates the refugees into 
"model villages" reminiscent of 
Vietnam's "strategic hamlets."Y Others 
leave the country entirely, many heading 
to Mexico, the United States or Canada 
and some 40,000 inhabiting UN- 
sponsored camps.= 
Not satisfied with the "success" of 
its counter-insurgency campaign, the 
US. developed a new program in 1987 
and 1988, invoking the "War on Drugs" 
to justify spraying vegetated areas in 
Guatemala with glycophosphate 
herbicides such as Round-Up- despite 
the fact that Guatemala does not appear 
on the UN's list of drug-growing 
natiomu The real target of the spraying, 
the Guatemalan government later 
admitted, was not marijuana or poppy 
but rather the  insurgent^.^^ In the 
meantime, the sprayings produced hu- 
man deaths, deformed children, 
ulcerations of the mouth and throat from 
drinking sprayed water sources, an 
increase in infant mortality, deaths of 
whole herds of livestock as well as honey 
bees and scores of endangered quetzals, 
destruction of an entire season of corn 
and tomato crops and widespread 
defoliationS26 Whether this use of toxic 
chemicals against a largely contrived 
pharmacological threat will also result in 
more human displacement, more 
urbanization, or more "modernization" 
remains to be seen; but the production of 
refugees through a herbicidal "War on 
Drugs" would certainly not be in- 
consistent with the modusoperandi of US. 
counter-insurgency as it has been 
practiced in Central America and 
elsewhere." 
On a moral level, the appropriate 
response to the social and environmental 
destruction caused by counter- 
insurgency tactics is repugnance and 
political opposition. But on a more 
analytic level I would argue that it is 
important to frame opposition to the 
production of refugees through ecocide 
with an understanding of the ways in 
which counter-insurgency fits into the 
context of development as it has been 
carried out by U.S. and other Western 
forces. For far from being an anomolous 
feature of development, ecocide and 
"forced-draft urbanization" represent 
simply the acceleration of tendencies 
that are already present in the broad 
process of modernization as they have 
evolved over the centuries. Thus, the 
suggestions of Samuel Huntington and 
other U.S. planners, far from 
demonstrating mere moral depravity, 
demonstrate a sharpened consciousness 
of the developments that have propelled 
capitalism and simultaneously undercut 
- particularly in recent decades - the 
more agrarian alternatives to it which 
had been posited in much of the "Third 
World," 
A starting point for this line of 
analysis is to acknowledge that all 
transitions from one form of society to 
another involve at least ecological 
transformation and most likely, given 
the trends of history over many millenia, 
environmental destruction. The 
enclosure of the commons during the 
long centuries of capitalism's rise in 
England transformed much farmland 
into pasture for shee~.~aThe" Columbian 
exchange," which occurred in 1492 and 
subsequently, brought new crops, 
animals and diseases to the Americas 
and others back to Europe, Asia and 
Africa, set off a quite traumatic trans- 
formation of American ecology and 
societies.2g The Europeans who killed 
American Indians and displaced them 
from their homelands simultaneously 
transformed the natural environment, 
often tearing down forest and 
transforming wooded areas and 
grasslands into farm1and.M 
Furthermore, crop destruction has 
always been an integral part of the 
warfare by which subjugation and 
displacement of indigenous peoples is 
promoted. Seventeenth-century North 
American colonists destroyed Indian 
corn and other crops as a routine part of 
warfare.31 Destruction of a basic food 
source for the Plains Indians, the bison, 
was accomplished later through both 
conscious and unconscious means.J2 Kit 
Carson destroyed the food supplies of 
the Dineh (Navajo) people as he waged 
war against them during the 1 8 6 0 ~ ~  
earning their ultimate enmity by 
destroying their peach orchards - more 
than five thousand trees.33 In such 
developments, ecological transforma- 
tion and the uprooting of an indigenous 
population resistant to modernization 
were always implicitly intertwined. 
In the twentieth century, the 
interconnections between environ- 
mental destruction and population 
transfer simply became more plain - in 
large part because more advanced 
technologies of destruction (both 
military and nonmilitary) made the 
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possibility for massive environmental 
destruction and population dislocation 
more obvious. Counter-insurgency 
planning, which incorporates ecocide as 
a tactic, merely acknowledges this 
obvious connection and attempts to spur 
on the generation of refugees. 
In a sense, then, one could say that 
the reflections of Samuel Huntington 
and those like him show an awareness of 
trends that facilitate the capitalist 
development project: uprooting of 
resistance to modernization by warfare 
and concomitant environmental 
transformation has been a trend of 
history for centuries; urbanization and 
modernization have been trends within 
the capitalist world economy for at least 
the past one hundred years. The 
application of military power to the 
furthering of these trends, then, is very 
much like swimming downstream. For 
those who have attempted to stem the 
tide of this sort of rural social dislocation 
and environmental destruction, on the 
other hand, the situation has been much 
more vexed. Maoist revolutionaries, 
who saw wars of national liberation 
succeeding because of the strength of 
peasant resistance rather than merely 
because of the strength of the industrial 
proletariat, have proven to be right - in 
their time. But Huntington may well 
have been correct when he argued in 
1968 that their time is short and passes 
with the demographic transformations 
that turn formerly rural societies into 
urban ones." 
From this perspective, the 
production of environmental refugees 
through ecocide is not something that 
can be fought merely by opposition to 
militarism. Rather, the roots of social and 
environmental transformation in the 
development of capitalism must be 
addressed. The story of counter- 
insurgency as a tool for producing 
environmental refugees is only the 
history of capitalism "drastically and 
brutally speeded up." Eurocentric 
modernization has produced 
environmental destruction and refugees 
for the past 500 years; counter- 
insurgency and its unique forms of 
ecocide are only an intensification of the 
old battle using newer weapons. 
References 
Samuel Huntington, "The Basses of 
Accommodation," Foreign Affairs 46 
(1968): 648-652 
See, e.g., Bruce Cumings, Origins of the 
Korean War. Volume II. The Rmring of the 
Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990): 706-7. 
GabrielKolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, 
the United States and theModern Historical 
Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1985): 
144,239 
Ibid.: 239. 
Marilyn B. Young,The Vietnam Wars, 
1945-1990 (New York: Harper CnUins, 
1991): 82. Also see Wiiiiam Appleman 
Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd 
Gardner and Walter LaFeber, eds., 
America in Vietnam : A Documentary 
History (Garden City, New York: Anchor 
Press/Doubleday, 1985): 302. 
Militarization: The Environmental Impact, 
The Environmental Project on Central 
America (EPOCA): 3. 
Don Luce, in a talk given to Iowa City, 
Iowa, during 1988. 
EPOCA, op. cit. For a description of 
efforts to reconstruct Vietnam 
environmentally since the war, see 
Elisabeth Kemf, Month of Pure Light: The 
Regreening of Vietnam (London: The 
Women's Press, 1990). 
See Judy Chu, "The Trauma of 
Transition: Southeast Asian Refugees in 
America," in G.M. Nishinaka, ed., 
Bridging Cultures: Southeast Asian 
Refugees in America: Social Work with 
Southeast Asian Refugees (Los Angeles: 
Special Service for Groups: Asian 
American Community Mental Health 
Training Center, 1983). 
Kolko, op. cit.: 145; Young, op. cit.:190-91 
On the destruction from bombing, see 
EPOCA, op, cit, and Kemf, passim. Also 
see Joel Charney, Obstacles to 
Development in Vietnam and Kampuchea: 
US Embargoon Humanitarian Aid (Boston: 
Oxfam America, 1964). 
On Cambodia, see Michael Vickery, 
Cambodia, 1975-1982 (Boston: South End 
Press, 1984); Kampuchea: Politics, 
Economics and Society (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1986); Ben Kieman and Chantou 
Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 
1942-1981 (London:Verso, 1985). 
Refugee figures are from Kolko, op. cit ,: 
239; Chu, op. cit. 
See e.g., Bill Weinberg, War on the Land: 
Ecology and Politics in Central America 
(London: Zed Books, 1991): 58-64. Also 
see the 1985 Congressional report by US. 
Representatives Hatfield, Leach and 
Miller, "US. Military Assistance to El 
Salvador." 
EPOCA, op. cit.: 4 
See Weinberg, op. cit.: chap.9; EPOCA, El 
Sa1vador:Ecology of Conflict. 
EPOCA, El Salvador: 2. 
Ibid.; Tom Barry, Central America Inside 
Out (New York: Grove Weindenfield, 
1991): 196. 
Barry, op. cit.: 194 
EPOCA, Militarization: 4. 
Ibid.: 5 
hid .  
Barry, op. cit.: 264. 
Ibid.: 266; EPOCA, Guatemela: A Political 
Ecology, p.13; Weinberg, op. cit.: 53. 
Weinberg, op. cit.: 53 
EPOCA, Guatemela: 13 
Use of defoliants in the "War on Drugs" 
is now expanding in Andean countries 
such as Colombia and Peru where 
insurgencies still threaten the stability of 
U.S.-backed regimes. See, e.g., Latin 
American Weekly Report (20 February 
1992). 
A classic and still useful discussion of 
this issue is R.H. Tawney's The Agrarian 
Problem in the Sixteenth Century (New 
York : Harper & Row, 1967). 
See Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian 
Exchange: Biological and Cultural 
Consequences of 1492 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972). 
For a useful overview of this process, see 
Joseph M. Petulla, American 
Environmental History (Columbus: 
Merrill Publishing, 1988): parts I & 11. 
See, e.g., Francis Jennings, The Invasion of 
America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant 
of Conquest (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1976): 153,210,211,321. 
A standard account of thisisDeeBrown's 
Bury M y  Heart at Wounded Knee (Toronto: 
Bantam Books, 1972). 
Ibid.: 27 
One author, who also seems to feel that 
revolutionary struggles such as the one 
in Vietnam have passed their historical 
moment, is Melanie Beresford who 
would disagree both in analysis and in 
spirit with virtually everything else that 
Huntington has to say). See her Vietnam: 
Politics, Economics and Society (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1988). 
30 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 1 (June 1992) 
